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RECENT DECISIONS
Why this particular combination of words should justify relief the
Court failed to explain. In that respect the Michigan Supreme Court
was doing only what other courts have done, denying relief under the
general rule or granting relief under some exception, without any satis-
factory analysis of the situation or discussion of the reasons for grant-
ing or refusing relief. With the aid of the now accepted "exceptions"
there is now no question of the power of a court of equity to rescind a
gift. The only problem lies in the propriety of exercising that power in
a given case.
Of course, the Lowry and the Stone decisions are Michigan cases.
The extent to which they will be followed in other states depends upon
the extent to which the principles of equity in those states are consis-
tent with the principles of equity as applied by the Michigan courts.
Much depends, also, upon the extent to which the courts in those states
are willing to invoke equitable jurisdiction under the circumstances in
question. In the last respect, it is doubtful whether relief would be
forthcoming in cases where, after the United States Supreme Court
decision, the tapayer formed the partnership. It is probable that such
a situation would be treated as one in which no relief is warranted.
DANmL A. KAEmFR
Torts - Contributory Negligence" by Patron at Wrestling Match-
The plaintiff while attending a wrestling match staged under the aus-
pices of defendant promoter and by defendant contestants was injured
when the referee was catapulted out of the ring onto his lap. The referee
left the ring in this manner by reason of an inopportune impact with one
of the contestants who had just missed placing a flying tackle on his
opponent. The plaintiff through choice occupied a front seat. It was
not shown how familiar the plaintiff was with wrestling matches. Held:
it was error for the trial court to take the question of contributory neg-
ligence from the jury. Klause v. Nebraska State Board of Agriculture,
35 N.W. (2d) 104 (Nebraska, 1948).
The point worthy of notice in this decision is that the plaintiff was
not contributorily negligent as a matter of law in placing himself in a
front seat. The question posed, therefore, is: when is a spectator at a
sporting event regarded as contributorily negligent in the choice of his
vantage point as a matter of law? The general rule appears to be that
2 "The term (assumption of risk) is rightly applicable only to master and
servant cases and is a result of a contract of hiring. City of Linton v. Mad-
dox, 75 Ind.App. 449, 130 N.E. 810. Contributory negligence implies mis-
conduct, the doing of an imprudent act by the injured party, or his derelic-
tion in failing to take proper precaution for his personal safety. Wheeler v.
Tyler, 129 Minn. 206, 152 N.W. 137." Black's Law Dictionary, "Assumption
of Risk," p. 160.
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such spectator must exercise due care in protecting himself against
known dangers or such dangers as should be known and appreciated
by a reasonable person in the exercise of due care.2 In the instant case
the Court held this rule not applicable, and stated:
"While it is shown that participants and referee often get
out of the ring yet it is not shown that a known characteristic
of such a departure from the regular wrestling precincts is the
knocking of the referee into the laps of spectators."
The general rule as stated requires two elements in order that con-
tributory negligence may be found as a matter of law; the first is the
source of the injury which must be from a "known danger", and the sec-
ond is selection by the spectator of a vantage point which must indicate
a failure to exercise due care. The Nebraska Court here held this fact
situation did not reveal a known danger.
When in any particular locality the hazard of attending a sporting
event becomes generally appreciated, the courts will declare such to be a
known danger 2 In baseball, being hit by a pitched or batted ball ;4 and
in ice hockey, being hit by a flying puck5 is considered a known danger
in areas where such game is a familiar sport. Baseball appears to be a
sport of such wide renown that most courts hold being hit by the ball
is a known danger. Hockey evidently hasn't become sufficiently widely
known in California," Nebraska,7 and Rhode Island8 for the courts to
hold being hit by a puck is such.
On the known dangers of wrestling one can only speculate. It would
seem plausible to say that a reasonable man would not think it unusual
if a contestant were thrown out of the ring onto the lap of a spectator,
or even if the referee were to leave the ring in a less accidental manner
than that illustrated in the present case.
2 Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.(2d) 90, 149
AJ..R. 1164 (1943). Also cases collected in 68 Corpus Juris 875. 31 Marq. L.
Rev. 298.3 Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W.(2d) 453 (1947); Hamniel
v. Madison Square Garden Corporation, 156 Misc. 311, 279 N.Y.S. 815, 149
A.L.R. 1181 (1935); Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal.App.(2d) 364, 97 P.(2d)
999 (1939). If actual appreciation of the danger is not had by the spectator,
it becomes a question of whether as a reasonable person he should have had
knowledge. Cases in which the plaintiff's ignorance of the hazard absolved
him have not the element of known danger in them. Shanney v. Boston
Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.(2d) 1, 149 A.L.R. 1179
(1936).4 Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo.App. 301, 153 S.W.
1076 (1913). Also cases cited in Hammel v. Madison Square Garden Cor-
poration, 156 Misc. 311, 279 N.Y.S. 815, 149 A.L.R. 1181 (1935).
5 Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, Inc., 245 App.Div. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505,
149 A.L.R. 1181 (1935).6 Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal.App. (2d) 364, 97 P.(2d) 999 (1939).
7 Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.(2d) 90, 149
A.L.R. 1164 (1943).8 James v. Rhode Island Auditorium Inc., 60 R.I. 405, 199 Atl. 293, 149 A.L.R.
1180 (1938).
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The second element, failure to exercise due care in the avoidance
of danger, can be determined from the location of the spectator's seat.
A seat so picked by him as reasonably to protect him from pitched or
batted balls, flying pucks or wrestlers would deprive the defendant
of his defense as a matter of law.9
Such is the matter stated generally. "Known danger" is susceptible
to the vagaries of judicial interpretation when methods of injury are
new to litigation. "Due care" becomes hard to pin down when the spec-
tator is more or less deprived of a choice of seats. The whole process
of determining contributory negligence will probably be more flexible
where it is not an absolute defense because of a comparative negligence
statute.
HowAim H. BOYLE, JR.
Torts -Liability Insurance and the Rights of an Unemancipated
Minor Child - A thirteen year old boy was injured when the auto-
mobile in which he was riding, operated by his mother, collided with
another car on a highway in Maryland. Acting by his next friend, the
infant sued his mother for damages. Defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint as failing to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted was denied by the District Court. Held: the defendant's mo-
tion should have been granted since under Maryland law an unemanci-
pated minbr could not sue a parent for injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile accident although the parent was protected by liability insurance.
Villaret v. Villaret 169 F. (2d) 677 (1948).
Two questions are thus presented for review: first, whether an un-
emancipated child may sue his parent for a tortious act and, second,
whether the fact that the parent is protected by public liability insur-
ance would affect the decision of the court.
It is well settled that an emancipated minor child may bring an ,ac-
tion for damages against a parent because of injury to person or prop-
erty, therefore, the two questions mentioned above become important
only when an unemancipated child is involved.'
The first case to clearly deny relief to an unemancipated minor
was Hewlett v. George.2 It was there decided that a child's right of ac-
tion against a parent for personal injury could not be maintained be-
cause it was contrary to good public policy.
The courts which deny relief do not distinguish between an inten-
tional tort and a negligent act. No cause of action has been recognized
9 Supra, note 4 and cases collected in 68 Corpus Juris 875.
139 Am. Jur. 736, note 2.268 Miss. 703, 9 S. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682 (1891); also see excellent article by
Prof. McCurdy in 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030.
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